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I want to begin with a caveat. I have no train-
ing in psychology, and my interest in the field 
is that of an amateur. Thus, the confidence 
with which I shall make statements about psy-
chological facts is in inverse proportion to my 
expertise. My point of departure is the as-
sumption that the most serious problem with 
contingent valuation (CV) methodology is 
hypothetical bias. Apart from introspection, 
the evidence for this assumption comes from 
two classic studies conducted by Richard 
Bishop and his colleagues at the University of 
Wisconsin. The first study by Bishop and 
Heberlein (1979) involved a survey of two 
random samples of individuals who had ob-
tained permits to hunt ducks in the Horizon 
Zone of East Central Wisconsin. One sample 
group was asked the hypothetical question 
whether they would be willing to sell their 
permit for a specified sum of money (this sum 
differed among individuals). The other sample 
group was given a real opportunity to sell their 
permit for a specified sum of money; of 237 
hunters surveyed, 105 actually sold their per-
mits. 
Using a methodology which I discuss in a 
later section, Bishop and Heberlein estimated 
willingness-to-sell (WTS) functions from these 
two sets of data. From the fitted WTS func-
tions, they derived an estimate of the expected 
selling price for an average individual which I 
denote C'. In Hanemann (1984), which is 
summarized in the third section, I propose two 
other measures of the average individuals' 
selling price which I denote C* and C
+. The 
results are: 
C'         C*  C
+ 
Hypothetical sale       $101     83.16          
Real sale   $ 63     31.02    114.22 
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As might be expected, in the hypothetical 
"market" people exaggerate the amount of 
money required to induce them to sell their 
duck hunting permit. The question is: Are the 
differences in WTS statistically significant? 
Since the values of C', C*, and C
+ are all 
derived from the estimated WTS functions, an 
appropriate procedure is to test whether the 
coefficients of the two WTS functions are sig-
nificantly different—this is equivalent to com-
puting confidence intervals for the two esti-
mates of C', C*, and C
+ and testing whether 
they overlap. The likelihood ratio statistic for 
testing the null hypothesis that the two WTS 
functions are the same is 25.14 while the .05 
critical value of the relevant X
2(2) distribution 
is 5.99. It seems clear, therefore, that the par-
ticipants in the hypothetical market experi-
ment responded in a significantly different 
manner from the participants in the real mar-
ket experiment. 
The second study by Boyle, Bishop, and 
Welsh (forthcoming) deals with the problems 
of starting point bias in conventional, iterative 
bidding CV experiments. Two samples of in-
dividuals were surveyed and asked about their 
willingness to pay to obtain a permit for a 
one-day deer hunt at Sandhill Wildlife Demon-
stration Area in Wisconsin. In one case this 
was a hypothetical question, and the partici-
pants did not actually have the opportunity to 
buy a permit; in the other case this was a real 
question, and the participants could actually 
buy a permit. In each case an iterative bidding 
format was employed, but the starting points 
varied widely among the participants in each 
survey. The resulting final "bids" were re-
gressed on the starting point values. In the 
case of the hypothetical "market," there was 
a statistically significant positive correlation 
between the final bid and the starting value. 
This suggests that responses can be manipu-
lated by the choice of the starting point: You 
can induce higher valuations by using higher 6         April  1985 
starting points. However, in the real market 
experiment, there was no  significant correla-
tion between the starting points and the final 
bids; when people were faced with a real op-
portunity to buy a hunting permit, their ex-
pressed willingness to pay was independent of 
the starting point. This, too, suggests that par-
ticipants in hypothetical market experiments 
behave differently than participants in real 
market experiments. 
At this point it may be useful to offer a 
definition of hypothetical bias, based on a 
homemade theory of psychology. I want to 
suggest that, most of the time, people do not 
consciously know their own preferences; they 
usually cannot introspect their utility func-
tions. Instead, they discover their preferences 
when they actually make a choice: a decision 
"pops into" their head. Their preferences are 
revealed to them as part of the actual choice. 
However, preferences are fairly stable (there 
may be a random component, but there also is 
a substantial deterministic component); there-
fore, if a person has faced the same type of 
choice on several previous occasions, he can 
estimate his own preferences with reasonable 
accuracy—he can predict what he would do if 
the choice arose in the future—by observing 
his own past decisions. As in economic 
theory, we rely on revealed preference to infer 
our own utility function and predict our behav-
ior. Consequently, if a person is asked how 
much he would be willing to pay for an item 
which he has, in fact, considered buying in the 
past, he can give a fairly "reliable" answer; 
but if he is asked about an item which he never 
had to choose before, he cannot give a mean-
ingful answer—he literally does not know how 
much he would pay for it. Thus, hypothetical 
choices induce inaccurate responses, and 
phenomena such as anchoring and starting 
point bias arise. 
   The crucial issue is one of degree: When we 
ask a hypothetical valuation question, rela-       
tively how much signal does the response con- 
tain and how much noise? If the response is 
entirely noise—people just do not know how 
much they would pay to save the gray whale         
and they give entirely meaningless answers— 
    then the results of CV surveys are useless. If 
                                                      the response contains some signal, as well as 
  noise, then we can perhaps obtain useful in- 
            formation from CV surveys. Suppose we be 
             lieve that CV responses do contain some sig- 
              nal. Then the question arises:  How can we 
             decode the signal? Do we have a theory of 
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how the noise is generated which would enable 
us to unscramble the response and uncover 
the signal embedded in it? I will give some 
examples of a decoding procedure in the next 
section; but, first, I want to emphasize the 
significance of the underlined clause above. It 
is not enough to have psychological experi-
ments which reveal that respondents fall prey 
to starting point bias or otherwise give inaccu-
rate responses to hypothetical choices. We 
need a psychological model of response for-
mation in these circumstances—in effect, we 
need a formula for the bias—if we are to derive 
useful information from the responses. 
Ultimately, the answer to these questions 
must come from controlled laboratory exper-
iments, such as those pioneered by Vernon 
Smith. Very little of this work is germane to 
the issues at hand. This is because, as I under-
stand it, in most experiments the organizer 
induced a well-defined utility function in the 
participants. Thus, the participants knew their 
preferences exactly, and the issue was how 
they acted on those preferences in various 
market settings. What is needed, instead, is to 
somehow mimic the type of uncertainty about 
one's own preferences that I believe arises in 
real-world CV studies and then examine how 
participants respond to different types of 
interview format (e.g., iterative bidding with 
starting points, noniterated bidding with pay-
ment cards, etc.). Moreover, one needs to 
vary the degree of the participants' uncer-
tainty about their own "preferences" and see 
at what point phenomena, such as starting 
point bias, begin to emerge. In the near future, 
Richard Carson and I plan to conduct some 
experiments on these lines. In the meanwhile, 
I want to focus on some other procedures, 
essentially statistical techniques, for deriving 
useful information from CV data. 
In the next section I discuss some proce-
dures for decoding the starting point "noise" 
in iterative bidding, continuous response CV 
experiments, and this is followed by a discus-
sion of the role of discrete response experi-
ments as a possible vehicle for obtaining more 
reliable valuations. 
Decoding Starting Point Bias in Iterative 
Bidding 
The first decoding procedure that I will discuss 
was proposed by Thayer (1981); I want to 
motivate it slightly differently and suggest a fjanemann 
new method of implementing it. The basic no-
tion is that there are two separate models—a 
model of the individual's "true" preferences 
and a model of the individual's behavior in 
response to the CV survey. The first model is a 
conventional utility-theoretic model of com-
pensating or equivalent surplus. An individual 
derives utility from money income, y, and 
from an environmental good, q; in addition, 
his preferences may vary systematically with 
either observable attributes (age, sex, previ-
ous experience of the environment, etc.) 
which are represented by the vector t. The 
resulting utility function will be written u = 
v(q, y; t).
1 Suppose that the individual's cur-
rent income is y0 and the current supply of the 
environmental good is q0. The individual is 
going to be asked about his willingness to pay 
for an improvement in the supply of the envi-
ronmental good to a new level qi > q0; his true 
willingness to pay is the quantity C which 
satisfies 
(1)  v(q1,  y0 - C; t) = v(q0, y0; t). 
Although C is the individual's true willing-
ness to pay, as revealed by introspection in a 
moment of quiet reflection, it is not necessarily 
the amount that he gives to the interviewer in 
the CV study. Two stories can be told here: 
the individual becomes bored during the itera-
tive bidding procedure and seeks to limit its 
duration. Alternatively, when he receives a 
starting bid, he takes this as an indication of 
what a reasonable valuation ought to be (i.e., 
anchoring) and wonders whether he should 
revise his own bid in the light of this "informa-
tion." Both stories may lead to the same 
model of response behavior: given his true 
willingness to pay, C, and the starting bid, Cs, 
the individual selects his response—his final 
bid—Cf by solving 
(2)  Minimize a(Cf - Cs)
2 + b(C - Cf)
2 
Cr 
where a > 0 and b > 0 are behavioral param-
eters. Under the first scenario, in solving (2) 
he is trading off a desire to be truthful against 
his impatience with the iterative bidding for-
mat; under the second scenario, he is deciding 
how much weight to place on his original, in-
stinctive valuation as against the new "infor-
mation." In either case, the behavioral re-
sponse model (2) has the solution 
1 This may be a direct utility function or an indirect utility 
function which arises after the individual has optimized with re-
spect to all private (nonenvironmental) goods. 
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(3)  Cf = (1 - δ) C + δCS 
where δ = a/(a + b); and 0 < δ = δ < 1. 
Thayer and others have applied this model 
by fitting a regression equation of the form 
(4)  Cf =  y + δCS 
and then deriving C from the relation 
(5)
  C 
=     
using the estimates of y and 8 in (4). However, 
this assumes the validity of the behavioral re-
sponse model (2) and does not subject it to a 
statistical test. The distinctive feature of the 
model (2) is that the final bid, C/, is a weighted 
sum of the starting bid, C2, and the individ-
ual's true valuation, C, where the weights are 
nonnegative and sum to unity.
2 How can this 
prediction be tested? By postulating a specific 
.functional form for the utility function v(q, y; 
t); solving (1) for the true valuation function 
C = C(q0, qi, y<>; t); fitting regression 
model 
(6)  Cr = yC(q0, qi, y0; t) + SCS; 
and testing the hypotheses that y = (1 — 8) and 
Os 8 s I.
3 For example, suppose one hypoth-
esizes that utility is a monotone transforma-
tion of 
(7)  v(q, y; t) = [y* + 0ft)qT" 0 > 0 
where 0(t) can be some parametric function of 
the individual characteristics, t; this is a con-
stant elasticity substitution (CES) function 
with an elasticity of substitution between 
money and the environmental good of cr = 
(1 - p)"
1. Then, (3) becomes
4 
(8)  Cf - (1 - 8){y0 - [0(qo
p 
- q/) + yo
p]
1/p> + 8CS. 
It would, of course, require nonlinear least 
squares to estimate (8) but such computer pro-
grams are readily available. 
2 To be sure, if one estimates (4), he can test whether 0 ss Ss 1; 
but he cannot test the other implication of (3), namely that the 
coefficients (1 — S) and 8 sum to unity. 
3 Rowe et al. propose a willingness to pay function for the final 
bids resulting from iterative bidding surveys that takes the form of 
(6), but no constraint on the sum (y + 8). 
4 This example assumes that the supply of the environmental 
good can be measured along some continuous scale. An alterna 
tive scenario is where there are only two states representing, 
respectively, the presence or absence of the environmental good. 
In this case, q is effectively a binary-valued variable. Here one 
could equivalently write the utility function as v(0, y; t) = [y° + 
6UO] and v(l, y; t) = [y° + 0,(t)], from which one obtains 
Cp = (1 - S)[y0 - (ft - ft + yo")"*]  + SCS- 8         April 1985 
This procedure yields estimates of the pa-
rameters of the utility function, 0 and p, as 
well as the parameter of the behavioral re-
sponse model, 8; it also permits us to test the 
behavioral response model against an alterna-
tive which I outline below. The test of the 
validity of the behavioral response model is 
conditional on the maintained hypothesis of 
the particular utility function, and one ought 
to repeat it using several different utility func-
tions for the sake of robustness. 
It is instructive to compare the nonlinear 
regression model (6) or (7) with the more con-
ventional linear regression model (4). If one 
assumes that (8) is the correct behavioral rela-
tion, it follows that (4) is misspecified since it 
contains a constant term and omits the vari-
ables q0, qi, and yfl. More generally, (4) implies 
that the true willingness to pay is constant 
across the sample and is independent of in-
come, the attributes t, and any random factors 
which affect preferences. This is most im-
plausible; from casual inspection of survey 
data, one often obtains an impression of strik-
ing differences in the valuation of environmen-
tal goods. If the formula for C were linear in 
the coefficients, of the general form C = X/3, 
one could apply Their s specification analysis 
to compare (4) with (6). In that case, making 
the reasonable assumption that the starting 
bids Cs are uncorrelated with the regressions 
in X, it would follow the estimate of S from (4) 
is  unbiased  and the estimate of the constant 
ternu'y.measuresU — 8)X/3,whereXisthemean 
value of the regressors across the sample; thus, 
(5) produces an estimate of C, the average true 
willingness to pay across the sample. However, 
the formula for C will usually be nonlinear in the 
coefficients, as illustrated by (8), and Their s 
specificationanalysiscannotbedirectly applied. 
In this case itisunclearwhetherfitting(4) instead 
of (8) yields a biased estimate of 8. 
So far, I have said nothing about the distur-
bance term in these regression models: I have 
implicitly assumed that a random error is 
added to the right-hand side of (4) or (8). This 
is appropriate if one assumes that there are 
measurement errors in recording the final bids, 
Cf, or that the presence of unobservable vari-
ables and/or variation in preferences justifies 
the imposition of an additive error on the for-
mula for C(q0, qi, y; t). An alternative ap-
proach is to introduce an explicit random ele-
ment directly into the utility function v(q, y; 
t)—for example, in the context of (7) one 
might assume that 0(t) is, say, a lognormal 
NJARE 
random variable with some mean and variance 
which depend on t. This is the so-called "ran-
dom utility" approach which will be discussed 
further in the next section. In effect, this ap-
proach converts (8) into a random coefficient 
regression model. Because of the nonlinearity, 
it would need to be estimated by maximum 
likelihood rather than weighted least squares. 
Letting fe(*) be the density of 0, the density of 
Cf can be obtained from fe(-) by change of 
variables; in particular, 
(9)    Pr{C, = X} = 
f  L   -   (X-gCJ1
p_ p1  v




I now want to discuss another model of in-
dividual behavior in responding to CV surveys 
as an alternative to (2); this is prompted by the 
recent papers of Carson, Casterline, and 
Mitchell (1984). Suppose that, given his origi-
nal willingness to pay, C, the individual en-
gages in a special form of yea saying during the 
course of the CV interview: if Cs > C, he 
raises his valuation of the environmental good 
beyond Cs; and if C > Cs, he lowers his valua-
tion below Cs. Specifically, suppose that 
(m    c   _ Cs + iMC, - C),    if Cs > C ^    
}       
f      c, - *(C - Cs),    if Cs< C 
where 0 < $ == 1. Then 
(11)  CF = (1 - 8)C + SCS 
where 6 = (1 + i//) ^ 1 and (1 - S) = -t//, with 
— i s (1 — 8)^0. The behavioral response 
function (11) is formally similar to (3), but the 
sign restictions on the coefficients of C and Cs 
are quite different. As before, one would sub-
stitute some specific parametric true valuation 
function, such as (7), into (11); and one could 
either assume an additive disturbance term 
and apply nonlinear least squares or adopt the 
random coefficient formulation and use maxi-
mum likelihood. One further point about (10) 
should be noted; when Cs < C, there is proba-
bly a constraint that Cf ^ 0. Thus, when Cs < 
C, the response might be C = max[0, Cs — 
i//(C — C3) in which case (11) becomes 
(11")    Q = max [0, (1 + 8)C + 8CJ. 
which is a nonlinear Tobit model. 
Observe that, whereas the behavioral model 
(2) implies that Cf ^ Cs« C ^ Cs, the behavioral 
model (10) implies that Cf ^ Cs •» C ^ Cs. A Hanemann 
variant of each model can be derived by follow-
ing the suggestion of Carson, Casterline, and 
Mitchell that the behavioral response may vary 
according to C > Cs or C < Cs. Thus, the loss 
function in (2) becomes 
(2')    minimize 
Cj 
fa(CF - Cs)
2 + bi(C - Cf)
2,    if C> Cs la(C, - 
Cs)
2 + b2(C - Cf)
2,    if C < Cs 
which leads to 










f      (1 - 6s)C + &>CS,    if Cf < Cs 
where 0^ Si s 1, i = 1,2, which is a switching 
regression model. Similarly, (10) becomes 
CIO'1     f   —      
s ~*~ T'
I'^"S       C),     it Os > C- 
f     cs + <MC - cs),   ifcs<c 
which leads to 
,,     c   ^ (1 - SOC + 8iCa,    if Cf > Cs 
U1 '        
f  max [0, (1 - 52)C + §,CS] 
if Cf < Cs 
where Si > land-1 < (1 - 6i)^0,i= 1,2, which 
is a mixed switching regression/Tobit model. 
Discrete Response Surveys 
The models (3), (30, (10) and (100 are exam-
ples of one method of dealing with the problem 
of hypothetical bias in CV surveys, viz., to 
assume that the bias takes a specific form (an-
choring on the starting point) and then to de-
code it. However, some features of this ap-
proach may still raise doubts. In particular, it 
presumes that the individual has a precise ini-
tial valuation of the environmental good, 
which he adjusts in response to the starting bid 
presented in the CV survey. This contradicts 
my earlier assertion that individuals do not 
know their true preferences until they actually 
make a real choice—as opposed to a hypothet-
ical one. Perhaps it is unwise, whether using 
an iterative or some noniterative procedure, to 
hope to pin people down to exact values of 
their willingness to pay for hypothetical 
changes in the supply of environmental goods. 
I want to suggest that their responses will be 
more reliable if they are required only to place 
bounds on their willingness to pay. Perhaps 
one can never give a meaningful response to 
the question: "How much are you willing to 
pay?"; but one can  give a meaningful re-
sponse to such questions as, "Are you willing 
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to pay at least $5.00?" or "Is your willingness 
to pay less than $20?" This leads me to argue 
that certain surveys involving only discrete 
responses are inherently more reliable than 
the conventional surveys which require a con-
tinuous response. 
The first example of a discrete-response ex-
periment is the study by Bishop and Heber-
lein, referred to earlier, in which a specific 
amount of money was designated for each sub-
ject; and the subject was asked if he would be 
willing to pay that amount for the environmental 
good. The resulting responses of "yes" or "no" 
were correlated with the amount of the offer 
using logit analysis. In Hanemann I have 
discussed how the statistical logit model can 
be related to an underlying utility theoretic 
model of individual behavior. The essential 
notion is the concept of random utility men-
tioned in the previous section, i.e., the notion 
that, from the viewpoint of the econometric 
investigator, the individual's utility function 
contains some stochastic components which 
are modeled explicitly. The presence of these 
components can be explained in various ways. 
They can be taken as representing errors of 
measurement or unobserved variables which 
are known to the individual but not the 
econometric investigator; alternatively, they 
can be taken as representing random variation 
in preferences across individuals. The random 
terms will be denoted e, which can be a scalar 
or vector; and the utility function will be writ-
ten: u = v(q, y; t, e). Accordingly, if the indi-
vidual is confronted with the amount $A and 
agrees to pay it, the probability that this re-
sponse occurs is 
(12)  Pr{willing to pay A} 
= Pr}v(q!, y0 - A; t, c) 
^ v(q0, y0; t, e)}; 
if the individual is unwilling to pay $A, the 
probability of that response is one minus the 
probability in (12). Depending on the distribu-
tion of e and the functional form of v(-), these 
probability statements may correspond to a 
logit or probit statistical model although pos-
sibly one that is nonlinear in the parameters. 
To continue the example based on (8) in which 
0 is treated as a random parameter (i.e., 6 = 
e), the probability statement in (12) becomes 
(13)  Pr{willing to pay A} 
= Prfe <   (y°-
A)
P ]- 
H    ~    (Qo" - «,') I' 10       April 1985 
if 6 is lognormal, this is a nonlinear probit 
model. 
I have argued that the individual does not 
know very accurately what is the most that he 
would be willing to pay for a change in the 
environmental good, but he does know rea-
sonably well whether it is less or more than 
$A. Nevertheless, in conducting benefit cost 
analysis, we do actually need to estimate (or 
infer) the most that the individual would be 
willing to pay. Suppose that he is asked, a la 
Bishop-Heberlein, whether he would be will-
ing to pay $8.00 for an improvement in the 
supply of the environmental good and he an-
swers, "yes." Then, we know that $8.00 is a 
lower bound on his true willingness to pay, but 
we have no idea what the upper bound is; if 
the cost of the change amounts to more than 
$8.00, this is a serious problem. In Hanemann 
I have shown how one can derive, from the 
responses to Bishop-Heberlein questions, es-
timates of the maximum willingness to pay for 
an individual with given income, y0, and 
characteristics, t. The key to this procedure is 
to postulate a specific, parametric random util-
ity model for the individual, set up the result-
ing statistical model for the responses to the 
survey as in (12) or (13), fit the statistical 
model (using the observed responses thereby 
recovering an estimate of the coefficient of the 
utility model, and then use the estimated util-
ity model to calculate willingness to pay as in 
(1). However, in the random utility context, 
there is the complication that the willingness 
to pay is a random variable. The analog of (1) 
is 
(10    v(qi, y0 - C; t, e) = v(q0, y0; t, e) 
which implies that C = C(q0, qi, y0; t, e). Two 
plausible procedures are to use the mean or 
median of the distribution of C(q0, qi, y; t, e) 
as our estimate of the individual's willingness 
to pay; I denote these by C
+ and C*, respec-
tively. In Hanemann I show how C
+ and C* 
can be calculated from the fitted statistical re-
sponse model; in terms of the graph in Figure 1, 
C
+ corresponds to the shaded area below the 
graph while C* is the value at which the esti-
mated response probability is 50 percent. 
The logic of this welfare calculation can be 
illustrated with a simplified example. Suppose 
that everybody has exactly the same prefer-
ences. The utility function is nonstochastic (no 
random variation in tastes) and is identical for 
everyone (the shift variables, t, and income, y, 
are identical). In particular, suppose that the 
<u" 
Figure 1. Response probability function and 
welfare measures in Bishop-Heberlein survey. 
common willingness to pay for the change in 
the environmental good is $10. I go out and 
interview a sample of people from this popula-
tion. I do not ask them directly how much they 
would be willing to pay; instead, as in Bishop 
and Heberlein, I name a particular sum, $A, 
and ask whether they would be willing to pay 
this amount. I find that, when A < $10, every-
body answers, "yes;" but when A > $10, 
everybody says, "no." I infer that the maxi-
mum willingness to pay is $10. It will be seen 
from the graph of the response function in 
Figure 2 that $10 corresponds to both the wel- 
Pr  (willing  to pay A) Hanemann 
fare measures, C
+, and C*. Thus, although 
this is a fanciful example, it serves to motivate 
these welfare measures. In the real world, of 
course, everybody's preferences are not  the 
same, for two reasons: systematic differences 
in preferences associated with variation in the 
observed shift variables, t, and random differ-
ences in tastes associated with e. The first type 
of variation in preferences does not affect my 
argument. I could draw a different response 
function, as in figure 2, for each possible value 
oft. The random variation in preferences as-
sociated with e does alter the story. Because 
of this, the response function has the shape 
shown in figure 1 rather than in figure 2 and the 
two measures, C
+ and C*, no longer coincide 
in general, but the general logic underlying the 
two figures is the same. 
One can characterize the Bishop-Heberlein 
type of survey as giving a single piece of in-
formation about the individual's willingness to 
pay for the change in environmental qual-
ity—either a lower bound (if the individual's 
response is, "yes") or an upper bound (if the 
response is, "no"). Clearly, one could go be-
yond the Bishop-Heberlein question while re-
maining within a discrete-response framework 
by developing both  a lower and  an upper 
bound on the maximum willingness to pay. If 
the individual answers, "yes," to the initial 
question, choose a larger amount, A', and re-
peat the question; if he answers, "no," to 
paying A', then you know that A and A' are, 
respectively, lower and upper bounds on his 
willingness to pay. Instead of (12), the corre-
sponding probability statement for the ob-
served response becomes 
n/n    pj willingness to pay       1 
U4J    ^(bounded by A and A'j 
Pr{v(ql, y0 - A; t, e) 
s= v(q0, y0; t, c) 
and v(ql5 y0 - A'; t, e) 
^ v(q0, y0; t, «)}. 
In the case of the CES utlity model, for 
example, one obtains 




av     1 = 
V    '        1 bounded by A and A' J 






^ e^   (Yo - Ay } 
qo
p ~ q/ I' 
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Thus, while remaining within a discrete-
response framework, one may actually obtain 
two pieces of information about the individ-
ual's preferences. Now, this may seem sus-
piciously like the iterative bidding, continuous 
response survey that I criticized earlier. The 
difference is one of degree: How finely does 
one attempt to bracket the individual's prefer-
ences? If the bracketing is very fine, one does, 
indeed, generate something that is equivalent 
to a continuous response model. However, 
what I have in mind is to keep the bracketing 
fairly coarse by offering the individual several 
broad ranges of money values and asking him 
which range contains his valuation of the 
change. In this way, one avoids trying to do 
what I believe is psychologically impossi-
ble—pinning the individual down to an exact 
statement of his valuation of the change. 
To summarize, there is a trade-off between 
the size of the sample in the survey and the 
quantity of information obtained from any re-
spondent, on the one hand, and the underlying 
reliability of the responses in the light of psy-
chological obstacles to valuing hypothetical 
choices, on the other hand. There is no doubt 
that a pure continuous response experiment 
yields the most information in the statistical 
sense or that a finely bracketed, discrete-
response experiment yields more information 
than either a coarsely bracketed, discrete-
response experiment or a Bishop-Heberlein 
discrete-response experiment. However, as 
one passes from the Bishop-Heberlein exper-
iment to a pure continuous response experi-
ment, in my opinion, the danger of obtaining 
unreliable and psychologically meaningless 
response increases. The optimal point along 
this continuum can be determined only by 
conducting both Monte Carlo simulation stud-
ies, to measure the change in statistical infor-
mation , and controlled laboratory experi-
ments, to measure the change in reliability. I 
hope to conduct such studies in the near fu-
ture. 
Conclusions 
In this section I want to comment on two 
topics: the role of explicit, parametric utility 
models and the possibility of conducting CV-
like studies aimed toward eliciting not fore-
casts of values but, rather, forecasts of behav-
ior. 
Throughout this paper, I have emphasized 12        April  1985 
the adoption of explicit parametric utility func-
tions, such as the CES function (7), in order to 
formulate statistical models for analyzing the 
responses to CV surveys—be they statistical 
models of continuous response surveys, such 
as (8), (9), (10), (11), (100, or (11"), or statisti-
cal models of discrete-response surveys, such 
as (13) and (15). I should point out that this can 
be extremely dangerous if it is not done prop-
erly. Once a function, such as the CES, is 
adopted, it becomes a. maintained hypothesis; 
we allow the data to tell us the correct value of 
p and 0, but we may forget to inquire of the 
data whether the CES form, as a whole, is 
correct. This can be avoided only by employ-
ing a. variety of parametric utility functions and 
then employing nonnested hypothesis tests to 
see which is the correct form and/or examining 
the robustness of valuation estimates across 
different function specifications. Another fac-
tor that should be borne in mind is the desir-
ability of employing random coefficient ver-
sions of the random utility hypothesis exem-
plified by randomness of B in the CES model 
as opposed to the conventional, additive-error 
random utility formulations that appear almost 
everywhere in the literature on logit and pro-
bit. I strongly suspect that the additive-error 
formulation induces too little variation in pref-
erences (or induces the wrong kind of varia-
tion in preferences) and reduces the goodness 
of fit. If these steps are not taken, we may 
obtain results which are essentially meaning-
less because of the straight)acket of an inap-
propriately specified utility model. 
Assuming that this warning is heeded, there 
are at least three reasons why I believe that 
one ought to work with explicit parametric 
utility functions. The first reason is to insure 
consistency in modeling the individual's re-
sponses; this is the analog of the integrability 
conditions in conventional demand theory. In 
Hanemann I have pointed out a violation of 
these consistency conditions in the ad hoc 
statistical logit model employed by Bishop and 
Heberlein. The second reason is that we often 
need to be able to extrapolate from the sample 
of individuals in the survey to others in the 
population who have quite different incomes 
or socioeconomic attributes (t); similarly, we 
may want to extrapolate to a different envi-
ronmental change from that employed in the 
survey questions. Both of these are impossible 
unless we have an explicit utility model. The 
third reason has to do with the quite common 
observation that it is often more difficult to 
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obtain reliable responses to willingness-to-
sell, as opposed to willingness-to-pay, ques-
tions in contingent valuation surveys. If we 
limit ourselves to willingness-to-pay questions 
but employ an explicit utility model, we can 
readily compute what the willingness to sell 
would be from the fitted utility model. 
Lastly, I want to point out that, although 
most CV studies (whether of the continuous-
or discrete-response variety) have sought to 
elicit expressions of the valuation of hypothet-
ical changes, there is no reason why one can-
not use similar procedures to elicit forecasts 
of  behavior  in hypothetical circumstances. 
Moreover, there may be an advantage in elicit-
ing forecasts of behavior because they may be 
less hypothetical than forecasts of valuations. 
To give a concrete example, suppose we want 
to measure the welfare loss to users of shutting 
down a recreation site. If we had travel cost 
data, we would postulate a utility function, 
derive and estimate the demand function, and 
then calculate some measure of consumer's 
surplus. To keep the example simple, suppose 
we postulate the no-income-effects demand 
function 
(16)  x = a — bp + « 
where the disturbance term, e, is treated as 
coming from a random utility formulation. 
Then, the loss of consumer's surplus for an 
individual whose travel cost is p0 is 
<">   
c -1(^-4 
If, however, we conduct a CV study, instead 
of asking individuals how much they would be 
willing to pay to avoid the closing of the site, 
we could, instead, ask them (for example) how 
high the price would have to rise before they 
ceased visiting the site completely. If we did 
this, it might still be possible to recover their 
preferences from their responses to this ques-
tion and employ the fitted demand (utility) 
model to calculate their welfare loss. Our 
question could be of the discrete- or contin-
uous-response variety. Following Bishop and 
Heberlein, we could ask them: "If the price 
rose by $A per visit, would you cease visiting 
the site completely, yes or no?" Suppose an 
individual answers, "yes." The probability of 
obtaining this response is Hanemann 
fcease visiting if] 
(18) Pr - - u  A =Pr{a - 0(Po + A)  v '  price rises by A  ^ * 
+ es 0} 
= Pr{e s — a 
+ ys(p0 + A)} 
which is a simple logit (or probit) model. To-
gether with Ivar Strand, I am currently con-
ducting an experiment based on this type of 
discrete-response CV data as well as the con-
ventional travel cost approach to fitting de-
mand functions; it remains to be seen whether 
the demand (utility) model implied by the CV 
responses is consistent with the demand func-
tion fitted to the data on actual site visitation 
behavior. 
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